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Some Thoughts on the Role of Substantive
Due Process in the Federal Constitutional
Law of Property Rights Protection
ERIC PEARSON*
INTRODUCTION
"Substantive due process" is the common name for the princi-
ple of federal constitutional law by which courts claim the right to
examine legislation for its content and to invalidate that legisla-
tion if the content is deemed on some basis to be unsatisfactory.'
The proclivity of courts to review legislation based on content first
emerged in the Nineteenth Century, when the United States Su-
* Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.
1. Note that there are other branches of federal constitutional substantive due
process law. One is the so-called incorporation theory, by which protections of the Bill
of Rights are made applicable to states. See, e.g., 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 404; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1939). Another is its companion, the
"reverse incorporation doctrine." See, e.g., Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(which applied the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government through the
5th Amendment Due Process Clause). Perhaps the best known of the branches of sub-
stantive due process law is the law of privacy, by which individual choices regarding
personal relationships and reproductive rights are insulated from overreaching gov-
ernment regulation. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003). For a succinct summary of the branches of sub-
stantive due process law, see Justice White's dissent in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977). These alternative branches of substantive due process
are beyond the scope of this Article.
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preme Court handed down two major decisions.2 The first of these
was the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court
proclaimed the judicial power to review legislation for its constitu-
tionality.3 The second was the famous (and infamous) decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, which declared the Missouri Compromise
to be unconstitutional. 4
The primary provisions of the Federal Constitution relied
upon to authorize this judicial practice have been the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, added to the
Constitution in 1791 and 1868 respectively.5 The text of these pro-
visions prohibits the federal government (Fifth Amendment) and
state governments (Fourteenth Amendment) from depriving per-
sons "of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."6 The
concluding five words of these passages-"without due process of
law"-suggests the Clauses were intended to provide process
rights only. So read, the Clauses would not serve to invalidate gov-
ernmental deprivations of life, liberty or property so long as those
deprivations were accomplished with due process of law. But the
Supreme Court has declined to treat the Clauses as if they were
purely procedural restraints, a declination that has engendered a
good deal of controversy. 7 The Court, rather, has viewed the
Clauses as ensuring "the guarantees of the basic social compact,"
2. This historical summation intentionally passes over the very early role played
by the ex post facto clause and the bill of attainder clause. These two provisions oper-
ated to protect property before the Due Process Clause rose to prominence. See gener-
ally Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: 11, 57 HARv. L. REV.
512, 514 (1944). Similarly, this discussion accepts but does not critique the early judi-
cial practice of relying on natural law theories to justify judicial review of legislation
for its content. See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879). With some
exceptions, see, e.g., Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 489 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Stevens, J.), reliance on natural law is no longer conventional judicial
practice.
3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). In Dred Scott, the Court found a 5th Amendment right to
own slaves as "property," even when specific states refused to define "property" to
include slaves. Thus the Court accorded the Clause a substantive content. In the view
of some, Dred Scott is given too much credit as a progenitor of substantive due process
theory. See, e.g., DON E. FERRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (1978).
5. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Hence, the term "substantive due process." Id. This term, apt as it is, did
not come into use until 1948. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18
(1980) ("We apparently need periodic reminding that substantive due process is a con-
tradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'"). See also, Ellis v. Hamilton,
669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (referring to substantive due process as a "ubiqui-
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and thereby has been willing to use the Clauses to invalidate arbi-
trary governmental actions, even if they are procedurally
unobjectionable.8
Substantive due process theory, despite some fits and starts, 9
gained its initial traction in the Nineteenth Century. As early as
1887, the Supreme Court directly engaged the question of whether
a statute adequately pursued its announced purposes, ultimately
concluding that the legislation under its review was valid.10 Not
long thereafter, in 1894, the Court proclaimed its broad authority
to examine state statutes on content grounds. 1 ' And, in 1905, the
Court upheld Massachusetts' compulsory vaccination program be-
cause it bore a reasonable and substantial relationship to the pro-
tection of public health. 12
The apex of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in
1905 in Lochner v. New York.' 3 In Lochner, the Court invalidated
tous oxymoron"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (calling substantive due process a "momentous sham").
8. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436 (7th ed.
2004). The Court's willingness to come to this view may have been influenced by his-
tory. The Due Process Clauses are widely viewed as offspring of the Magna Carta,
Chapter 39 of which provides: "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, desseised,
outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute
him, except by lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." A. E. DICK
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964). This provision was a "guar-
antee ... [ofl freedom from arbitrary acts by... [the] monarch." Id. at 23.
9. As late as 1872, in the famous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court character-
ized the Due Process Clause as a purely procedural provision. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872). In that decision, the Court held the statute, having
been enacted in a procedurally sufficient manner, to be valid despite its conferment of
monopoly status upon a single company. See also, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1877) ("For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts.").
10. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, the Court upheld, as a
valid exercise of the police power, legislation that prohibited the sale and manufac-
ture of liquors without a permit. Id. Mugler has been misread in succeeding years.
The Supreme Court itself characterized Mugler as a case commenting on the issue of
how much burden on property is tolerable for takings purposes under the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958) (describing Mugler as standing for the principle that "the mere fact that the
regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property is
not necessarily enough to establish the owner's right to compensation."). Id. at 168. In
fact, Mugler is not a takings case because the governmental action reviewed therein
did not occasion the deprivation of property rights, since the activity regulated in
Mugler was nuisance behavior, and property rights do not authorize nuisance
behavior.
11. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner has been described as "unprecedented in its time
and unmatched since." Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996).
3
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legislation simply because it deemed the legislation to be un-
sound. 14 The Court then blithely supplanted its own judgment for
that of the legislature. 15
In the years since Lochner, substantive due process theory
has remained an operative principle of judicial review. But the
strident Lochner formulation of the doctrine has given way to an
approach more deferential to legislatures. 16 In the current day,
the judiciary does not invalidate legislation merely because it dis-
likes what a legislature has done. Courts, rather, hold their fire
unless they view the legislation as failing to constitute a reasona-
ble means to a legitimate end.1 7
This Article does not engage the enduring question of whether
courts, as a general matter, should review legislation for its wis-
dom, policy, or efficiency. The Article, rather, will discuss how and
why principles of substantive due process have spilled over the
canals of the Due Process Clauses to become part and parcel of the
law of the Contract Clause' 8 and the Takings Clause.' 9 These lat-
ter Clauses are in place to protect personal rights in contract and
in property, respectively, from untoward governmental interfer-
ence. In early times, the Court invoked these Clauses without re-
gard to, or employment of, substantive due process theory. That is
no longer the case. In the current day, whether legislation contra-
venes either of these constitutional guarantees-that is, whether
a government action has objectionably impaired a right in con-
tract or in property-has been made to depend in significant, if
not controlling, measure on the worthiness of the government ac-
14. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 ("We do not believe in the soundness of the views
which uphold this law.").
15. For an argument that Lochner was less nettlesome than is conventionally un-
derstood, see Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due
Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 611-13 (1936).
17. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, (1987). This shift hear-
kened back to the teachings of an earlier case, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894),
see supra note 11 and accompanying text, that itself was given short shrift by Loch-
ner. Lawton advised that "To justify the State in... interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public ... require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." 152 U.S. at
137. See also, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (uphold-
ing a municipal zoning ordinance so long as it was not "clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.").
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[Vol. 25
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tion precipitating the alleged offense. In the current day, the
closer a statute is to being a reasonable means to a legitimate end,
the better its chances to survive Contract or Takings Clause re-
view. It is the underlying thesis of this Article that the migration
of substantive due process theory beyond its original home-the
Due Process Clauses themselves-has been unjustified.
Part One of the Article reviews the early jurisprudential evo-
lutions of the Contract and Takings Clauses. Part Two discusses
the subsequent insinuation of substantive due process doctrine
into these areas of constitutional law. Part Three of the Article is a
criticism of this doctrinal slippage. Since the Contract Clause has
receded in importance over time, the critique in Part Three will
concentrate on the impropriety of substantive due process theory
in takings law. Part Four introduces and examines a recent Su-
preme Court decision entitled Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc.20 In
the author's view, Lingle represents the first real hope in many
years that the law of the Takings Clause (and, to the extent rele-
vant in the current day, the law of the Contract Clause) might
repair to a more sensible place, that is, free of the influence of
substantive due process.
I
A
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass
any .. .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."21 The Tak-
ings Clause provides that private property shall not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation."22
In the early Nineteenth Century, it was the Contract Clause,
not the Takings Clause, which played the predominant role in pro-
tecting property, rights in which often arise by the vehicle of con-
tract. In place to protect individuals solely from state action, 23 the
Contract Clause was useful precisely because it was states that
were in the business of interfering with personal rights.24
20. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1931).
24. The Takings Clause could have served the same purposes with respect to fed-
eral action, see Barron v. Baltimore, 7 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833), but the federal govern-
ment at the time was engaged in other endeavors.
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In its earliest deliberations, the Supreme Court viewed the
Contract Clause as broadly protective of private rights. 25 But it
was not long before the Court realized that a Contract Clause of
broad reach and protective effect would undercut the increasing
need of government to promote the health, safety, welfare and
morals of the public.26 In the Court's view, on some occasions, for
government to work, impairments of contracts were necessary.
With a rigid non-impairment principle in place, a person seeking
to obviate government regulation could do so simply by enshrining
his or her proposed action in a contract. Accordingly, in order to
fend off this constitutional equivalent of a "get out of jail free"
card, the Court undertook to read the Contract Clause more nar-
rowly. Thus, it held, for example, that a law that revived a con-
tract otherwise void at common law did not "impair" that
contract.27 Later, it upheld legislation that added to contract obli-
gations, on the theory that adding an obligation was distinct from
impairing a contract. 28 In the same vein, it declined to invalidate
legislation that removed contract obligations. 29 And it left intact
laws that prevented contractual obligations from arising in the fu-
ture, on the theory that only contractual rights already in exis-
tence could be impaired. 30
This concerted retreat, it should be emphasized, was accom-
plished by the exclusive mechanism of revising the interpretation
of the Contract Clause's specific terms. The Court simply assigned
to those terms meanings more narrow in reach and effect than it
had in its earlier decisions. At this point, the Court had not in-
fused into the jurisprudence of the Contract Clause considerations
25. See generally Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819) (invalidating
a bankruptcy statute that would have released a debtor from paying the entirety of a
credit); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 654 (1819) (holding
that state-induced alterations to a corporate charter violated the Clause). But see
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827) (upholding a state bankruptcy law that
facilitated the discharge of debts).
26. See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. 420, 580 (1837).
27. Saterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 380 (1829); Ewell v. Doggs, 108 U.S. 143, 150
(1833).
28. See, e.g., Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907). This reading was
called into question in the early Twentieth Century. See, e.g., Columbia Ry. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 251 (1923) ("[Tlhe impairment of a contract
may consist in increasing its burdens as well as diminishing its efficiency.").
29. See Sturges, 17 U.S. at 208. This latter holding opened the door for enactment
of divorce laws, statutes of limitations provisions and other such measures.
30. See generally Hale, supra note 2, at 518.
[Vol. 25
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/1
20081 THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 7
of the worthiness of the government actions implicated in the
cases.
B
Contemporaneous with this retraction of Contract Clause pro-
tection, the Supreme Court was enlarging the protective reach of
the Takings Clause. Actually, the Court could hardly have done
otherwise. In its earliest decisions, the Court had refrained from
invoking the Clause other than in situations involving the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain. 31 The idea at this time was
that the Takings Clause came into play only when government
attempted to directly and physically expropriate property against
the wishes of the titleholder of that property. 32
The Court, however, soon observed the many ways govern-
ment can eliminate or damage rights in property other than by
use of eminent domain authority. Consequently, the Court moved
to make more available the protections of the Takings Clause. Us-
ing analogous reasoning, the Court concluded that if compensa-
tion was due when government took title by eminent domain,
compensation ought to be due as well when government, using
other powers, effectively produced the same harm.
Perhaps the first decision implementing this more expansive
view of the Takings Clause was United States v. Lynah.33 In
31. See, e.g., N. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) ("[A]cts done in
the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon pri-
vate property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not
to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision."). See also Stephen
A. Seigel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 81 ("[Clonfinement of the Constitution's protection of property under that takings
clause to a proscription of uncompensated seizures was a fundamental facet of nine-
teenth-century constitutional law.").
32. William Michael, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) (commenting,
inter alia, on the intended application of the Clause as limited to "direct, physical
takings of property by the federal government."). For a recent case affirming this orig-
inal understanding see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1057
(1992) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (noting that the drafters of the Constitution believed
the Takings Clause to proscribe only formal expropriations of private property, that it
did not reach "regulations of property, whatever the effect."). But see id. at 1028 n.15
(Scalia, J., writing for the majority) (characterizing that original limitation as "en-
tirely irrelevant"). Justice Scalia's approach to takings cases has been described as a
divergence from his usual originalist methodology of constitutional interpretation.
William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393-94
(1993).
33. 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
7
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Lynah, the Court awarded compensation when the federal govern-
ment flooded a parcel of private land. 34 The Court saw this gov-
ernment action as the functional equivalent of a seizure of fee
simple title. 35 On the same theory, the Court in a later decision
required compensation when government flooded only a portion of
a parcel of land. 36 If a total flooding, as in Lynah, was tantamount
to seizure of a fee interest in land, a partial flooding surely was
tantamount to seizure of an easement interest in land.37
The Court extended the principle again in 1946, in United
States v. Causby.38 In that case, plaintiffs protested the federal
government's practice of persistently flying bombers, transports,
and fighter planes at low altitudes over their land. 39 The aircraft
noise and vibration destroyed the landowners' chicken business
and made impossible any normal residential use of the property.40
In this circumstance, the Court again ordered compensation, even
though plaintiffs had not been physically dispossessed. As the
Court viewed it, making impossible the reasonable use of land was
the practical equivalent of dispossessing the owners of that land.
In the Court's language, the fly-overs created land use burdens "in
the same category" as those compensated in the earlier cases.4 '
This judicial enlargement of the reach of the Takings Clause
shared a common feature with the contemporaneous judicial re-
traction of the reach of the Contract Clause: in both contexts, the
Court undertook its doctrinal evolutions by focusing on constitu-
tional text. In the Contract Clause cases, as noted above, the
Court examined when a "contract" had been "impaired." In these
Takings Clause cases, it examined when "property" had been
"taken." While the end products of these jurisprudential evolu-
tions were disparate-the Contract Clause receded in significance
while the Takings Clause grew-and while both evolutions may
well have been influenced by policy-driven, external concerns, still
the core of the judicial approach was the same. Constitutional
34. Id. at 459.
35. Id. at 470.
36. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917). Before Cress, the Court had
distinguished between incidental damage and damage amounting to a total depriva-
tion of use of land, allowing compensation only for the latter. See, e.g., Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 566-67 (1914).
37. Cress, 243 U.S. at 329.
38. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
39. Id. at 258-59.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 265.
[Vol. 25
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meaning was gleaned from clausal text. It was not determined by
reference to the efficacy, wisdom, or overall credibility of the vari-
ous government actions precipitating the controversies. 42
42. A comment on the famous 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), may be in order at this point, for some observers might view
Pennsylvania Coal as the formal introduction of substantive due process theory into
takings law. In the author's view, Pennsylvania Coal does not take on that status.
The famous Pennsylvania Coal decision presented to the Court the question
whether the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute that had stopped the Pennsylvania
Coal Company from mining coal it owned, was constitutional. Id. at 394. The Com-
pany argued the statute deprived it of the entirety of the value of its subsurface prop-
erty rights and was, for that reason, unconstitutional. Writing for the majority,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes decided the matter by engaging a balancing exercise.
He assessed the quantum of harm produced by the state legislation, which he deemed
to be essentially one-hundred percent, and balanced that against the benefit the stat-
ute produced, which he determined to be minimal, in large part because the mecha-
nism of simple notice could have produced the same benefits. Id. at 413-14. Based on
that analysis, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to the plain-
tiffs land. Id. at 416.
Pennsylvania Coal has been characterized as a major takings case, the decision
that moved Takings Clause jurisprudence into the universe of government regulation.
Before the decision, government seizures of title or direct interferences with the use
or value of land had qualified for Takings Clause review, see discussion infra Part
II.B, but the Takings Clause had not been called upon in a case where the com-
plained-of government action was mere regulation. If viewed as a takings case, Penn-
sylvania Coal can be read as having done just that, and as having incorporating
substantive due process reasoning into Takings Clause jurisprudence in the process.
Pennsylvania Coal, however, is better read as a purely substantive due process
case. Consider the major components of the decision. As an initial matter, Justice
Holmes specifically accepted the litigants' invitation to decide the case by assessing
"the general validity of the act." Id. at 414. Then he went on to lament the legal state
of affairs if regulation could diminish property rights with abandon. Property rights
still have some sum and substance, he argued, "or the contract and due process
clauses are gone." Id. at 413. Indeed, "[Glovernment could hardly go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." Id. at 413. Still, he went on, the right of government
to burden property rights does have limits, and "[olne fact for consideration in deter-
mining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act." Id. at 413.
What Justice Holmes was saying in Pennsylvania Coal was that any statute that
too seriously burdens property rights can be found to be unconstitutional for that rea-
son. As he phrased it: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416. But-
and here is the important point-the Kohler Act was not invalid because it violated
the Takings Clause. It was invalid, rather, because it inadequately promoted public
welfare, that is, it failed to meet the requirements of substantive due process. The
enormous detriment the statute visited on private property justified the conclusion
that the statute was not a reasonable means to a legitimate end. Of course, a statute
of this configuration might fail for Takings Clause purposes as well, but that was not
Justice Holmes's message in Pennsylvania Coal.
9
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II
A
The Court abandoned this judicial approach with respect to
the Contract Clause in 1934, when it inoculated the jurisprudence
with a strong dose of substantive due process theory. The vehicle
for this doctrinal reconstruction was Home Building & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell,43 a 5-4 decision examining a state statute, the Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium Law, that was enacted to alleviate
burdens on mortgagors during the years of the Depression. 44 In its
Contract Clause discussion, the Court began by referencing past
decisions, observing in this regard that the Contract Clause was
less than absolute in its protective effect. 45 The Court's previous
decisions, it acknowledged, had focused on what is a "contract"46
and what constitutes "impairment" of a contract.47 But then, in-
stead of relying on those precedents to decide the case at bar, the
Court in Blaisdell selected a new jurisprudential path seemingly
designed to weaken the Contract Clause even more. As an initial
matter, the Court declared that the State's sovereign interests
should be actually "read into" contracts. 48 By this, the Court
Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in the same case ratified this reading of the
majority opinion. As the dissent put it, the Kohler Act easily survived substantive due
process review because it was a "restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened." Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "[Tihe
state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public." Id. at 417. Moreover, he added, "[Cloal in place is land, and the
right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not use it as to create a
public nuisance, and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously
threaten the public welfare." Id. at 416.
Importantly, both the Holmes majority opinion and the Brandeis dissent relied
for their respective conclusions on appraisals of the reasonableness of the Kohler Act.
Nowhere in Pennsylvania Coal did Justice Holmes or Justice Brandeis mention the
Takings Clause.
43. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
44. Id. at 415-16. The Court decided the case on Contract Clause, Due Process
Clause and equal protection grounds.
45. Id. at 428.
46. Id. at 429-30.
47. Id. at 430-34.
48. Id. at 434-35 ("[Ihe State also continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that
end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.' Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as
a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual rela-
tions are worthwhile,-a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society.") (citation omitted).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/1
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meant that private contracts by their very nature presuppose a
continued authority in States to protect society.
This declaration-that contracts actually incorporate the
state's interests in promoting the public welfare-was only an ini-
tial step. The Court went on to effectively eviscerate its previous
case law. It did so with a concise but exceedingly remarkable
statement: "the question is not whether the legislative action af-
fects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether
the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."49
This breathtaking passage transformed Contract Clause into
a constitutional vehicle for review of legislation based on its con-
tent. Why did the Court do this? Surely the dire economic condi-
tions of the Depression years, and the perceived need for a
vigorous governmental response to abate these conditions, influ-
enced the judges in the direction of public power. So implied the
Blaisdell Court itself, when it acknowledged its interest in "pre-
vent[ing] the perversion of the clause through its use as an instru-
ment to throttle the capacity of the States to protect . .
fundamental interests."50 But still one must wonder. The Court
had already significantly disabled the Contract Clause by its prior
narrow readings of the Clause's terms. 51 Accordingly, when the
Court spoke in Blaisdell, the Clause already lacked any real ca-
pacity to "throttle" states.
For better or worse, the Blaisdell revision of Contract Clause
doctrine remains the lodestar of the Court's jurisprudence in this
area. Two major judicial decisions of the 1970s are demonstrative.
In United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the Court
reviewed a challenge to a New Jersey statute which by its terms
49. Id. at 438. All of this provoked a vigorous dissent from Justice Sutherland,
joined by his reliable three colleagues on the Court, Justices Butler, VanDevanter,
and McReynolds. Justice Sutherland argued the state lacked power to save finan-
cially stressed mortgagors because the Contract Clause flatly prohibits any impair-
ment of contracts. Id. at 453-54. In his view, while a state might frustrate a contract,
by declaring its premises unlawful, it may not impair a contract otherwise lawful. Id.
at 478.
What the legislature has done is to pass a statute which does not have the
effect of frustrating the contract by rendering its performance unlawful,
but one which, at the election of one of the parties, postpones for a time
the effective enforcement of the contractual obligation, notwithstanding
the obligation, under the exact terms of the contract, remains lawful and
possible of performance after the passage of the statute as it was before.
Id. at 478.
50. Id. at 444 (majority opinion).
51. See cases cited supra notes 26-30.
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had repealed a covenant between the State of New Jersey, on the
one hand, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, on
the other.52 While the covenant had obligated the State to subsi-
dize rail passenger transportation, the statute unilaterally re-
leased the State from this obligation. 53 In other words, the State
had used its sovereign power to simply remove significant contract
obligations it, the State, had earlier and willingly assumed. Rely-
ing on the Contract Clause, a plurality of four justices found the
repealing legislation to be invalid. 54 The Court's reasoning: while
conceding that "the Contract Clause does not require a State to
adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its
sovereignty," still, in the majority's view, this particular contract
was of financial significance only.5 5 It did not implicate the State's
sovereignty. The invalidation of the statute, therefore, "did not
compromise... the State's ... reserved powers."56 Important for
our purposes, the Court grounded its decision in substantive due
process theory:
[A] State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obliga-
tions simply because it would prefer to spend the money to pro-
mote the public good rather than the private welfare of its
creditors. We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962 covenant if
that impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the
admittedly important purposes claimed by the State."57
This repealer, the plurality determined, was neither reasonable
nor necessary.58
A second decision that confirmed the ascendancy of substan-
tive due process doctrine in Contract Clause cases was Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus.59 Following U.S. Trust by a
year, Allied reviewed another Minnesota statute, the Private Pen-
sion Benefits Protection Act ("PPBPA").60 As applied to plaintiff
Allied Structural Steel Company, the PPBPA resulted in the im-
52. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 32. The Justices were Blackmun, joined by Burger, Rehnquist and
Stevens.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 29-32.
59. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
60. Id. at 234.
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position of a pension funding charge of about $185,000.61 The com-
pany successfully contended this statutorily mandated
assessment violated the Contract Clause because it impaired the
company's pension contract with its workers. 62 While acknowledg-
ing the Contract Clause is not the "Draconian provision" its text
would seem to indicate, 63 the Court in Allied found the statute's
interference to be "severe" and retroactive, indeed, imposing a
"completely unexpected liability" of "potentially disabling
amounts." 64 The plaintiff, moreover, was being forced to comply in
toto immediately. Significantly the whole arrangement was not
"necessary to meet an important general social problem."65
U.S. Trust and Allied enshrine the central role that substan-
tive due process theory currently plays in Contract Clause cases.
In both of these decisions, the Court's gave significant weight to
the matter of the character of the legislative enactments giving
rise to the controversies. They did not give significant weight to
the matter of "impairment" of "contract."
B
From the mid-1930s until the 1970s, during which time the
Contract Clause underwent the above-discussed transmutation,
Takings Clause jurisprudence was on a different trajectory. Sub-
stantive due process theory was having a much harder time insin-
uating itself into this arena of constitutional law. In fact, during
these years, takings law and substantive due process law lived
amicably, side by side, separate and distinct. A good example of
that peaceful coexistence was the Supreme Court's 1962 decision
in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.66 By all appearances a routine
case, Goldblatt involved a legislative prohibition on sand and
gravel mining.67 The Court took care in Goldblatt to isolate its dis-
cussions of the disparate constitutional doctrines. First, address-
ing the takings question, the Court determined that the
prohibition under examination caused no unconstitutional depri-
vation of private property for the reason that the prohibition did
not reduce the value of the affected parcel.68 Having completed
61. Id. at 239.
62. Id. at 240-50.
63. Id. at 240.
64. Id. at 247.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 594.
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that analysis, the Court engaged the substantive due process
question, whether the statute was an appropriate exercise of po-
lice power authority. At this juncture, it evaluated the statute's
reasonableness, the menace it sought to rectify, the availability of
"less drastic protective steps" and (in line with the teachings of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon69), "the loss which appellants will
suffer from the imposition of the ordinance." 70 Because there was
no evidence tending to demonstrate the statute was unreasonable
in design or operation, the Court declined to invalidate it.71
Goldblatt's bifurcated approach to these matters was not to
endure, however, largely because of the profound influence of one
of the giants of the Supreme Court, Associate Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. During his extensive tenure on the bench,72 Justice
Brennan harbored the resolute belief that property rights simply
should not stand as an obstacle to the exercise of public power. He
had revealed this strong jurisprudential predisposition, in fact, in
the U.S. Trust decision, 73 and, even more significantly, in the Al-
lied case. In his dissent in Allied, he explained why the Court
should effectively write property rights protection out of the
Constitution:
69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
70. Goldblatt, 69 U.S. at 595.
71. Id. at 596.
72. Nominated for the Court by President Dwight Eisenhower, Justice Brennan
served from October 16, 1956, until July 20, 1990, a total of 33 years, 9 months, and 4
days. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Celebrating Justice Brennan,
http://www.brennancenter.org/pages/celebratingjusticebrennan (last visited March
27, 2008).
73. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 13 (1977); see also supra notes
52-58 and accompanying text. In his vigorous dissent in U.S. Trust Co., joined by
Justices White and Marshall, he had contended the Contract Clause should not stand
in the way of New Jersey's repeal of its covenant obligation to subsidize public trans-
portation. Successive legislatures, he asserted, should be entirely free to modify the
actions of previous legislatures as necessary to further the public welfare. U.S. Trust
Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 46-47. Why?: "[Aill private rights of property, even if acquired
through contract with the State, are subordinated to reasonable exercises of the
State's lawmaking powers in the areas of health, environmental protection, and
transportation." Id. at 50 (citations omitted). The U.S. Trust Co. plurality, he intoned,
was "creating a constitutional safe haven for property rights embodied in a contract."
Id. at 33. This "new resolve to protect property owners," in Justice Brennan's view,
was entirely inadvisable. Id. at 61. Interestingly, Justice Brennan contended the Su-
preme Court had already endorsed his broader reading of legislative power stating
that "lawful exercises of a State's police powers stand paramount to private rights
held under contract." Id. at 33. Thus, the plurality's approach "substantially distorts
modern constitutional jurisprudence governing regulation of private economic inter-
ests." Id.
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The Contract Clause, of course, is but one of several clauses in
the Constitution that protect existing economic values from gov-
ernmental interference. The Fifth Amendment's command that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation" is such a clause. A second is the Due Process
Clause, which during the heyday of substantive due process
largely supplanted the Contract Clause in importance and oper-
ated as a potent limitation on government's ability to interfere
with economic expectations. Decisions over the past 50 years
have developed a coherent, unified interpretation of all the con-
stitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations
and these decisions have recognized a broad latitude in States to
effect even severe interference with existing economic values
when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare. At
the same time the prohibition of the Contract Clause, consist-
ently with its wording and historic purposes, has been limited in
application to state laws that diluted, with utter indifference to
the legitimate interests of the beneficiary of a contract duty, the
existing contract obligation.7 4
The above-quoted paragraph served to announce Justice
Brennan's overarching view that (a) private rights in "existing ec-
onomic values" should pose no bar to state initiatives on behalf of
the public, so long as those initiatives are "reasonably necessary"
and (b) Due Process, Contract, and Takings Clause doctrine were,
in reality, a single body of doctrine.7 5
While Justice Brennan was never able to convince the Su-
preme Court to adopt his unitary view of federal constitutional
property rights protection, his hard-hitting rhetoric has nonethe-
less borne fruit. This is especially so with respect to the Takings
74. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus. 438 U.S. 234, 259-60 (1978) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).
75. Notably, for the principle that the Contract Clause should not invalidate state
legislation falling short of "diminish[ing] the efficacy of any contractual obligation,"
Justice Brennan cited Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), a due
process/takings case. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. In other parts of
the opinion, he cited due process cases as authority. See, e.g., Allied, 438 U.S. 234 at
255 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) and Hadachek v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
As a separate matter, Justice Brennan's dissent in Allied characterized the Min-
nesota statute under review as an attempt to avert the "frustration of expectation
interests" that would otherwise fall upon unwary pensioners. Id. at 252. This remark
displayed what has become another pillar in Justice Brennan's jurisprudence-the
idea that expectation interests (as contrasted with conventional property rights) war-
rant protection. In this case, Justice Brennan did not find the statute's interference
with expectation interests to be objectionable.
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Clause, for it was Justice Brennan who, more than any other indi-
vidual, invited substantive due process theory into the law of tak-
ings. He extended his warm welcome in 1978, in the landmark
decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.76
Penn Central presented a controversy involving New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law, which was enacted to pre-
serve urban architecture of historic significance. 77 Because of the
Law, the Penn Central Transportation Company had been denied
permission to add an office building atop its Grand Central Termi-
nal in Manhattan. 78 The City disallowed the add-on because it
would have diminished Grand Central's "magnificent example of
the French beaux-arts style."79 The Company, for its part, argued
that the ordinance worked a taking, but the Court of Appeals for
the State of New York found no constitutional infirmity.80 The
United States Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, affirmed.
Writing for a six-member majority,81 Justice Brennan began
with what might be politely described as an entirely questionable
description of Supreme Court precedential authority on the Tak-
ings Clause. Past courts, he observed, "quite simply" had been
"unable to develop a 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than remain dis-
proportionately concentrated on a few persons."'8 2 This comment
76. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Cen-
tral, one should observe, was decided essentially contemporaneously with Allied.
Penn Central was argued before the Court on April 17, 1978, and handed down on
June 26, 1978; Allied was argued on April 25, 1978, and handed down on June 28,
1978.
77. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108-09.
78. Id. at 116-17.
79. Id. at 115. The Commission stated:
"[We have] no fixed rule against making additions to designated build-
ings-it all depends on how they are done .... But to balance a 55-story
office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more
than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply, the tower would overwhelm the Ter-
minal by its sheer mass. The 'addition' would be four times as high as the
existing structure and would reduce the Landmark itself to the status of a
curiosity."
Id. at 117-18.
80. Id. at 120.
81. Comprising the majority were Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell. Id. at 106.
82. Id. at 124. (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)
("[T]here is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.")).
This is not to say that justice and fairness have been irrelevant in takings analysis.
Justice and fairness, however those terms might be defined, have been part of takings
[Vol. 25
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propounded the remarkable implication that pre-Penn Central
takings law was nothing more than a ragbag of random decisions
which, taken as a whole, could not qualify to be called a jurispru-
dence. Justice Brennan then proceeded to make express that
which he had implied, by characterizing the body of pre-1978 tak-
ings decisions as nothing more than "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries," falling upon "particular circumstances."8 3
This misdirected commentary neatly disassembled the en-
tirety of preexisting Takings Clause doctrine. With a single
stroke, Justice Brennan had freed himself from the burdens of two
hundred years of stare decisis. He could then proceed to create a
new law of takings, and he did so, by unveiling three factors
which, as he saw it, had attained "particular significance" in fed-
eral takings jurisprudence up to that time.8 4 The factors he identi-
fied were "economic impact," "interfere [nce] with investment-
backed expectations," and "the character of the government ac-
tion."8 5 The precise meaning of each of these factors he left to fu-
ture cases.
Applying these factors in the Penn Central litigation, Justice
Brennan had no trouble finding the Landmark Law to be constitu-
doctrine to the same extent they have been part of all doctrinal law. Indeed, the Court
itself has linked takings law with the notion of fairness. See, e.g., United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) ("[The] Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of
fairness."). But justice and fairness have served as underlying goals of takings doc-
trine; they have not been, as Penn Central intimated, takings doctrine itself.
83. Penn Central, 438 U.S at 124. For a contrary view, see discussion supra Part
I.B, demonstrating a consistent and principled evolution of Takings Clause doctrine
over that span of time. The Penn Central Court cited two cases for this assertion. The
first was United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). Central
Eureka was a challenge to a federal mine shutdown order instituted as part of the war
effort in World War II. In an introductory passage, the case characterized "whether a
particular governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a
question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case." Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168. The Court found no taking "since the damage to
the mine owners was incidental to the Government's lawful regulation of matters rea-
sonably deemed essential to the war effort." Id. at 169. The second case cited by the
Court was United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). Caltex, also a wartime
case, was a challenge on takings grounds to the United States' requisition and de-
struction of an oil depot on the Philippine Islands. The government had destroyed the
site to deprive advancing Japanese forces of the value of the depot after their capture
of the islands. In finding no right to compensation, the Court commented on the state
of the law: "This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be
attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign. No rigid rules can be
laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case
must be judged on its own facts." Caltex, 344 U.S. at 155-56.
84. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
85. Id.
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tional. He noted, first, that none of the participants in the litiga-
tion had contested the character of the government action.
8 6
Given the lack of comment by the parties, the Court assumed the
character of the government action to be commendable.8 7 With re-
spect to the economic impact to the plaintiff caused by this prohi-
bition on development, Justice Brennan discerned no injury
beyond limits deemed allowable in past cases.88 Last, he con-
cluded the Landmark Law did not interfere in any significant way
with the Railroad's investment-backed expectations because the
Law did not disturb the present use of the Grand Central Termi-
nal as a railway station. 9 Taken as a group, therefore, all three
factors urged a finding of constitutionality.
Penn Central transformed takings doctrine in at least two dis-
tinct and significant ways. First (and not examined in the text of
this Article) was its identification of investment-backed expecta-
tions ("IBEs") as a primary criterion in takings cases. 90 More sig-
86. Id. at 129. This absence of commentary might be seen as not unexpected, since
the parties to the case lacked prior notice of both the existence and centrality of this
newly announced factor.
87. Id. at 129.
88. Id. at 136. Had the Court viewed "air rights" as a distinct interest in property,
it would likely have concluded the economic impact of the application of the
Landmark Law to Penn Central's terminal to be unconstitutionally severe. But the
Court chose to view "property" as a unitary commodity. Its focus was on rights "in the
parcel as a whole." Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). Thus, it was "untenable" that a
loss of "air rights" would be sufficient to trigger compensation. Id. at 130.
The Court has held to this approach in succeeding years. See, e.g., Andrus v. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("[A]t least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."). But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (the deprivation of a "single strand" in the bundle, the right
to exclude, causes a taking regardless of other considerations).
89. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. The Landmark Law examined in Penn Central
had taken away "air rights" above the Grand Central Terminal. These air rights were,
in the Court's view, non-IBE rights. Id.
90. The IBE factor has been influential since its introduction. In Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), for example, the Court reasoned the federal govern-
ment's release of commercial trade secrets could rise to the level of a taking, if those
trade secrets were the subject of "reasonable investment-backed expectations." Such
trade secrets, the Court found, harbor the major indicia of "property" and, therefore,
warrant protection under the Takings Clause. Id. at 1002-03. In Concrete Pipe &
Products of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Califor-
nia, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), the Court refused to find a taking when a statutory provision
required increases in employer contributions to employee pension plans because the
employers "could have had no reasonable expectation that [they] would not be faced
with liability." Id. at 646. See also Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala, 79 F.3d. 516,
524 (6th Cir. 1995); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d. 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("[Olne who buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss.").
But see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (holding a retroactive
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nificant, for the purposes of this Article, was the case's infusion of
substantive due process into the law of takings. This was done in
two ways. The first was via the identification of "justice and fair-
ness" as the goal of takings law. This new goal in practice consti-
tutes an invitation to judges to consider matters beyond economic
harm to property rights as they deliberate takings disputes. The
second vehicle for the insinuation of substantive due process into
takings law was the designation of the new "character of the gov-
ernment action" factor.91 The character factor requires courts in
law that increased liability of employers for payments of medical benefits deprived
persons of legitimate expectations and was, therefore, a taking).
While in these cases the IBE factor doomed the takings claims, in other cases it
can play a minor role or no role at all. In Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001), the property owner's knowledge of pre-existing regulations at the time of
purchase of real property was thought to defeat his claim that those regulations pro-
duced a taking. Id. at 626. After all, if he had purchased a parcel of land after a
regulation that burdened the parcel's use was on the books, he should have had every
expectation that he would hold the property subject to that regulatory burden. Ac-
cordingly, the state court in Palazollo held the claimant's "postregulation acquisition
of title was fatal" to his claim. Id. Yet the Court refused to give the State's argument
any credence whatsoever, effectively rendering the IBE factor irrelevant to the deci-
sion. Id. at 627.
[W]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be al-
lowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This
ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge
unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.
Id. at 627.
91. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-28. Some commentators have concluded the
character criterion was foreshadowed in other cases. See, e.g., Craig A. Peterson,
Land Use Regulatory 'Takings' Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39
HASTINGS L.J, 335, 348 (1988) (suggesting that Penn Central "amplified the meaning"
of a necessarily preexisting character criterion, but not specifying the initial identifi-
cation of the factor). See also, Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1084 (1992).
Rubenfeld suggested the decision in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872),
originated the factor by calling for a per se rule for finding a taking in every case of
physical occupation. But the judicial focus in Pumpelly was on the issue of harm to
rights in property: the reason the Pumpelly Court declared the physical occupation
(flooding) to be a taking was because it harmed the titleholder. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at
181. The case never said nor intimated that all physical occupations, even those caus-
ing no injury or only de minimis injury, should automatically be declared to be
takings.
In support of his character factor, Justice Brennan cited a single sentence from
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The sentence in Causby was the follow-
ing: "[It is the character of the occupation, not the amount of damage resulting from
it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines whether it is a taking."
Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. Causby, hjwever, fails to support Justice Brennan's new
factor. In Causby, the Court's concern was that the government's flyovers of plaintiffs
property caused harms much more than "incidental." Id. at 265. For that reason,
stated the Court, those flyovers were "in the same category as invasion of the sur-
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takings cases to evaluate the worthiness of any statutory enact-
ment purportedly occasioning a harm to rights in property. A stat-
ute deemed more worthy becomes commensurately more difficult
to overturn, 92 while a statute deemed less worthy becomes less
difficult to overturn. 93
This "marriage" of substantive due process and takings law
has produced real-world consequences. In Andrus v. Allard,94 for
example, the Court refused to find a taking despite a virtually
complete destruction of the plaintiffs affected property rights.
95 It
face." Id. at 265. When the Causby Court stated that it is the "character of the occupa-
tion" which "determines whether it is a taking," therefore, it was confirming that, in
the law of takings, it is harm to property that matters. Causby, accordingly, stands for
precisely the opposite principle for which Justice Brennan cited it. The Causby Court
itself cited United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. Cress
was a partial flooding case in which the Court had found a taking. Cress used the
same "character of the occupation" language, and, like Causby, the focus in Cress was
on harm. Cress, 243 U.S. at 328. The Cress Court found no constitutional distinction
between total and partial flooding cases because "it is the character of the occupation,
not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that
determines the question whether it is a taking." Id. The Cress Court went on to
clarify:
As the court said, speaking by Mr. Justice Brewer, in United States v.
Lynah, . . . 'Where the government by the construction of a dam or other
public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially
destroy their value, there is a taking within the scope of the 5th Amend-
ment. While the government does not directly proceed to appropriate the
title, yet it takes away the use and value; when that is done it is of little
consequence in whom the fee may be vested. Of course, it results from
this that the proceeding must be regarded as an actual appropriation of
the land, including the possession, the right of possession, and the fee;
and when the amount awarded as compensation is paid, the title, the fee,
with whatever rights may attach thereto,-in this case those at least
which belong to a riparian proprietor,-pass to the government and it be-
comes henceforth the full owner.' There is no difference of kind, but only
of degree, between a permanent condition of continual overflow by back-
water and a permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring
overflows; and, on principle, the right to compensation must arise in the
one case as in the other. If any substantial enjoyment of the land still
remains to the owner, it may be treated as a partial instead of a total
devesting of his property in the land.
Id.
92. Justice Brennan identified tax laws, zoning laws, and (curiously) laws inter-
fering with interests insufficient to qualify as "property," as among this more worthy
group. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. Governmental actions which "promote the
health, safety, morals or general welfare" were placed in this group as well. Id. at 125.
93. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 at 124 ("[A] taking may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical occupation by
government ... than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.").
94. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
95. Id. at 65.
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did so because it viewed the result to be just and fair.96 Another
example is the decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictus.97 In Keystone, the Court examined Pennsylvania's
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act,98 Sec-
tion 4 of which prohibited mining that caused subsidence damage
to three categories of structures. 99 Finding no taking, the Court in
Keystone wrote: "the character of the government action involved
here leans heavily against a taking; the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant
threat to the common welfare."100
The character factor and the "just and fair" goal have also
spurred the birth of two entirely new takings tests. 10 1 The first of
these is the per se "permanent physical occupation" test. 10 2 De-
clared into being in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC
Corp.,103 this test invalidates as unconstitutional any statute that
empowers government to permanently situate a physical object on
private property. 104 The other new takings test given life by Penn
Central, announced in Agins v. Tiburon,105 declared any law that
fails to "substantially advance legitimate state interests" to be in
violation of the Takings Clause. 0 6 The permanent physical occu-
pation test authorizes courts to find unconstitutional takings even
when the harm to property is de minimis,10 7 while the "substan-
96. Id.
97. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
98. Id. at 474.
99. Id. at 476-77. The categories were certain public and noncommercial build-
ings, private dwellings, and cemeteries. Id.
100. Id. at 485. The Court found the statute in Keystone to be worthier than the
Kohler Act of Pennsylvania Coal, in that it served "important public interests" and,
unlike the Kohler Act, manifested "none of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for
the benefit of private parties." Id. at 485-86.
101. Beyond the scope of this discussion is yet a third new takings test, announced
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, the Court
declared that any government action producing a total loss of property value must
fail, per se, as an unconstitutional taking. This test is a logical outgrowth of Penn
Central's economic impact factor.
102. A per se test is one that can invalidate a statute irrespective of any other
considerations.
103. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
104. Id. at 432. In Loretto, the object installed on private property was equipment
necessary for the cable television industry to provide services to urban residents. Id.
at 421.
105. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
106. Id. at 260.
107. The harm to property rights implicated in Loretto was valued at a single dol-
lar. 458 U.S. at 423.
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tially advances" test allows invalidations even in cases entirely
uninvolved with abrogations of property rights!1
08
III
Thus, the Supreme Court has incorporated substantive due
process theory into its Contract and Takings Clause cases. It
should not have done so.
A fundamental argument against this doctrinal adulteration
finds its source in constitutional text. The Contract Clause pro-
vides that "[N]o State shall .. .pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contract."10 9 The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that proper.y shall "not be taken for public
use without just coripensation."110 The text of each of these provi-
sions does nothing more than isolate a constitutional value to be
protected-contracts are not to be impaired and property is not to
be taken. The Clauses, quite simply, do not provide for otherwise
unconstitutional impairments and takings to miraculously be-
come constitutional merely because the government has some per-
ceived good reason for what it does. If the Framers meant for
these Clauses to authorize reasonable government behavior
rather than restrain such behavior when it compromises desig-
nated protected values, they would have said so. 1
108. A corollary to the "substantially advances" test can be found in Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). Yee found a taking when an apparently fully effica-
cious statute treated similarly situated persons dissimilarly: "[Wihere the govern-
ment merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if
considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives
the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as
a whole." Id. at 522-23.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Notably, the early draft of the Takings Clause was in
line with the adopted version. The early draft stated that no person shall be "obliged
to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), quoted in THE COM-
PLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 361 (Neil H.
Cogan, ed. 1997) (setting forth a draft of the provision, proposed by James Madison in
the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789).
111. The drafters of the Constitution knew how to write. For an example of a con-
stitutional provision designed to authorize government behavior if reasonable, see the
Fourth Amendment, which protects "[tihe right of the people to be secure... against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Ex-
amples of constitutional provisions establishing an inviolable constitutional value or
right abound. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "in all
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/1
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With respect to the Takings Clause, an additional considera-
tion militating to this conclusion is its original purpose. The Tak-
ings Clause is located in the Bill of Rights. The whole purpose of
the Bill of Rights was to make clear that persons would enjoy
rights exercisable against the government, that certain individual
rights were islands of inviolability beyond governmental interfer-
ence. 112 With respect to the Takings Clause, the idea was that
property might only be confiscated in situations of the most press-
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury.... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "in Suits at com-
mon law, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. II
(stipulating "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed .... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."); U.S. CONST.
amend. III (providing that "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.").
112. As an historical matter, the initial omission of a Bill of Rights by the Framers
of the Constitution was not an unthinking one. In fact, Alexander Hamilton, a pri-
mary drafter of the Constitution, had actively opposed the addition of such a charter
to the document, on the ground that the built-in structural restraints were sufficient
to protect individuals from encroaching government. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
84, 556 (Alexander Hamilton) The rights he thought were already protected were the
rights of persons against impeachment to suffer no direct penalty other than loss of
rights to public office, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7, the protection of habeas corpus,
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, the restrictions on bills of attainder, U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 3, cl. 3, the restriction on titles of nobility, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7, the right to
trial by jury, U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 3, and the right to be free of conviction for
treason save the testimony of two eyewitnesses, or confession in open court, U.S.
CONST. art.3. § 3. All of these protections, with the possible exception of the provision
regarding titles of nobility, he stipulated, were "immunities" designed to insulate per-
sons from government intrusion. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra, at 561. Hamilton
argued that some of these rights were greater than those provided in state constitu-
tions. Id. at 557.
But, as Edward Mead Earle's 1937 Introduction to a publication of the Federalist
Papers testifies, Hamilton's view was not uniformly accepted:
It speedily became apparent during the debates on ratification that the
Constitution was deficient in at least one important respect. Anglo-Amer-
ican constitutional experience has wisely emphasized the importance of
individual rights as against the omnipotent power of the state. The State
constitutions adopted during the Revolution and subsequently had incor-
porated bills of rights, specifying those immunities of the citizen which
might in no wise be invaded by his government. Despite some limitations
on governmental power, the Constitution drafted at Philadelphia in-
cluded no bill of rights, and on no score was it so generally condemned.
Edward Mead Earle, Introduction to ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES
MADISON, THE FEDERALIST xxi (Modern College Library ed., Random House, Inc.)
(n.d.) (emphasis added).
Madison himself is on record in support of the protection of property for its own
sake. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV.
531, 539 (Summer 1995). The Takings Clause of the Bill of Rights, moreover, was
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ing urgency. 113 Accordingly, both the text and history of the Tak-
ings and Contract Clauses militate to the conclusion that an
interbreeding with substantive due process is unwarranted. 114
Even if there exists some plausible argument that substan-
tive due process theory has a legitimate home in the Contract and
Takings Clauses, the inexorable result is an unworkable doctrinal
configuration. First is the problem of complexity. Simply put, the
addition of substantive due process theory in these constitutional
arenas complicates the judicial task by obliging judges to evaluate
the worthiness of legislation-an onerous task in and of itself-
and additionally to balance that worthiness with and against the
added to assure rights in property would serve as a bulwark against encroaching
government.
113. The Federal Farmer, No. 6, Dec. 25, 1787, cited in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 375 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997).
See also James Madison, "Property" in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Wil-
liam T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1977) ("Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort .... This being the end of government, that alone is a just government,
which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.").
This analysis, it should be emphasized, is premised upon an originalist approach
to constitutional interpretation, one which maintains the constitution has a fixed
meaning that does not change over time. For a particularly effective defense of the
originalist approach, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1990). In Judge Bork's words, "The Constitution may be
changed by amendment.... It is a necessary implication.., that neither statute nor
Constitution should be changed by judges." Id. at 143. Presumably, neither should
they be changed by time. Judge Bork contended the Fifth Amendment was meant to
apply in any circumstance where government action occasioned uncompensated harm
to persons in their capacities as titleholders of property. By his analysis, even if the
First Congress had a specific problem or problems in mind at the time of adoption (i.e.
the seizure of title to private property by government), its adoption of more general
language legitimates the use of the Clause in contexts unforeseen by the Framers. Id.
at 143-60. Thus, "it is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the
framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we
know. The world changes in which unchanging values find their application." Id. at
167-68.
114. While the historical record on the Takings Clause is sparse, it should be noted
that some commentators read the history differently. Professor Joseph Sax, for one, in
an article written fourteen years before the Penn Central decision, asserted the Tak-
ings Clause was inserted to require reasonableness in government action rather than
to create an island of inviolability for persons. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964). Professor Sax disagreed that the Clause was installed
to assure "the substantial maintenance of economic values against governmental dim-
inution." Id. at 54. That idea, he contended, is one of the "abiding myths in American
constitutional law." Id. at 54. In Sax's analysis, the takings principle sprung from the
medieval Christian tradition of "just price" and that concept, in turn, necessarily im-
plicates considerations of social justice, id. at 55, since the early concern centered on
the "imposition of loss by unjust means." Id. at 57. The historical evidence to support
this view, Professor Sax conceded, is scant. Sax goes on to mention that "no really
satisfactory discussion or analysis has been found." Id. at 58.
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other ambiguous criteria. The result is a jurisprudence of both un-
certain content and unpredictable future effect.115
The imposition of this balancing test, moreover, superimposes
a more general problem of judicial legitimacy. Routine judicial de-
cision-making involves, first, the selection of an applicable legal
standard, located in an external source such as a constitution,
statute, precedent, or custom, and then the application of that
standard to the particular facts of the case. Judicial balancing is
the antithesis of this classic judicial function. When judges bal-
ance, they must do much more than simply select and apply an
external standard. Instead, they must pick and choose among sev-
eral standards and then assign appropriate weight to each. The
practical effect of this exercise is the employment of individual
discretion to decide cases. Where one judge may view one stan-
dard as more important in resolving a case, another may place
greater weight on a competing standard. Resolutions of cases are
thus made to depend on judges' personal values. As stated by one
observer, "balancing tests do not invite judicial activism; they re-
quire it."116
Judicial balancing, while always troublesome, is particularly
so in the world of takings law. As we have seen, Penn Central
designates three factors for balancing-economic harm, interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the government action. The problem is this: the first two factors
(economic harm and IBEs) relate to the exercise of government
power in a particular case. They inquire whether the govern-
ment's regulation, when applied to an individual, so harms that
individual as to cause a taking. The character factor, on the other
hand, typically relates not at all to the specific exercise of govern-
ment power implicated in a case. Rather, this latter factor as-
sesses the worthiness of a statute as a general matter. The
evaluation is a categorical, or per se, one." 7 This dichotomy makes
the Penn Central balancing test all the more unworkable. Is it re-
ally possible for courts to delicately balance a single per se factor
115. See supra Part II.
116. See, James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution,
51 ALA. L. REV. 1095, 1096-97 (2000).
117. Penn Central explained the factor on precisely these categorical grounds. Said
the Court, "a taking may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical occupation by government ... than when interfer-
ence arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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with (or against) two as applied factors, and then somehow use
that mix to rationally resolve a fact-sensitive takings claim? 118
One is left to hope that the constitutional law of takings and
of contracts might return to first principles, that is, to a condition
free from the interference of substantive due process.
IV
On May 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided a case entitled
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.119 Lingle was a challenge on tak-
ings grounds to a Hawaii statute enacted to protect independent
gasoline retail dealerships from a harm seemingly more imagined
than real.' 20 The statute prohibited oil companies from acting to
convert these dealerships into company-owned outlets, even
though no such pattern of conversion had emerged. 12' The
lawmakers apparently wished to prevent market concentrations
that such a practice might produce.' 22
Among the restrictions instituted by the statute was a limita-
tion on the amount of rent oil companies might charge lessee-oper-
ated dealerships. 23 Chevron U.S.A. argued this rent cap worked
an unconstitutional taking because, under Agins v. Tiburon, 24 it
failed to substantially advance any legitimate government inter-
est. At the lower level, the litigation became a battle between two
competing experts. 25 Finding one expert more persuasive than
the other, the lower court concluded the statute substantially ad-
vanced a legitimate government interest, and accordingly passed
constitutional muster. 26 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 127
118. Note also that using substantive due process theory to control what is essen-
tially a takings case is untenable for the additional reason that it allows litigants to
sidestep ripeness requirements. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985). By prevailing on a
substantive due process claim, that is, a facial attack against a statute because of the
statute's poor design, the plaintiff escapes any requirement to seek a variance or oth-
erwise attempt to avoid what would be the harmful effect of the application of the
ordinance to plaintiffs property.
119. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
120. Id. at 533.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 544-45.
123. Id. at 533.
124. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
125. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 535.
126. Id. at 536.
127. Id. at 536.
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In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the Court reversed, specifically overruling the "sub-
stantially advances" test of Agins. 128 The Court's rationale was
refreshingly straightforward: "[W]e conclude that this formula
prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings,
test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurispru-
dence."1 29 The Agins opinion, the Court commented, confused, al-
beit understandably, these two areas of federal constitutional
law.' 30
The Supreme Court began its opinion in Lingle with a review
of takings law, during which it identified the Loretto (permanent
physical occupation), Lucas (total takings), and Penn Central (bal-
ancing) takings tests.13' The Court then distinguished these tests
from the Agins "substantially advances" test. Each of the first
three, argued the Court, "aims to identify regulatory actions that
are functionally equivalent to the classic taking where govern-
ment directly appropriates private property or physically ousts
the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests pur-
portedly focuses on the severity of the burden imposed on property
rights."'32
This premise distinguished these tests from the Agins "sub-
stantially advances" test:
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed
above, the 'substantially advances' inquiry reveals nothing
about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular reg-
ulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it pro-
vide any information about how any regulatory burden is
distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test
does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are
128. Id. at 545.
129. Id. at 540.
130. Id. at 542.
131. Id. at 538-39. The total takings test provides that any government act that
strips away all value of land is a per se taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
132. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. Referring to the Loretto test, the Court contended that
a permanent physical occupation imposes a "unique burden" that effectively "eviscer-
ates the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using her property inter-
ests." Id. The Court described the total takings test of Lucas in similar terms,
commenting that a "complete elimination of a property's value" is too severe a burden
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. As for the Penn Central balancing test, it
"turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's eco-
nomic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property inter-
ests." Id. at 540.
27
28 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
functionally comparable to government appropriation or occupa-
tion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of the
Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regula-
tory actions to be challenged under the Clause. 133
Consequently, proffered the Court, the idea that a regulation
accomplishes a taking merely because it is foolish or ineffective
was simply "untenable."134 Beyond that, the Court found the judi-
ciary ill-suited to determine whether laws are foolish or ineffec-
tive. 135 A better way to decide these cases, accordingly, would be
the bifurcated approach of Goldblatt:
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation's effect on private
property, the "substantially advances" inquiry probes the regu-
lation's underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically
prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation ef-
fects a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the gov-
ernment has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose ...
Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissi-
ble-for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' require-
ment or is so arbitrary as to violate due process-that is the end
of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such
action. 136
The Court strained to create the impression that its decision
in Lingle was little more than judicial housekeeping. The Court
stressed, for example, that no prior judicial decisions invoking the
"substantially advances" test-of which there were few in any
event-needed to be overturned.1 37 And, as explained above, it ex-
pressly reaffirmed the continued viability of the other takings
tests, including the widely used balancing test of Penn Central. 38
Despite this conscious effort to downplay the decision, Lingle
ought to be regarded as enormously important, for within it are
133. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).
134. Id. at 543.
135. Id. at 544.
136. Id. at 543.
137. Id. at 545.
138. Id. at 548. Perhaps this conscious minimization of the importance of the deci-
sion explains why Lingle received very little public attention when handed down. Five
days after the decision, the Washington Post ran a piece slightly longer than 500
words praising the repudiation of the "substantially advances" test. See Editorial, Ju-
dicial Takings and Givings, WAsH. POST, May 28, 2005. But other major newspapers,
including The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times, and national magazines
as well, remained silent according to a LexisNexis search conducted June 1, 2005,
using search terms "Lingle and taking."
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the seeds of a ground-level-up reconfiguration of the law of tak-
ings. For starters, Lingle does not co-exist comfortably with
Loretto's permanent physical occupation test. On the contrary, de-
spite the Court's assertions to the opposite, Lingle repudiates
Loretto. In Lingle, the Court distinguished Loretto on the theory
that the permanent physical occupation test dealt with "unique
burden[s]" on rights in property. 139 But this characterization-of
permanent physical occupations as takings because they impose a
"unique burden"-is entirely unconvincing. As a starting point, in
many circumstances, permanent physical occupations hardly im-
pose burdens at all.140 What if, for example, a local government
took it upon itself to install smoke detectors in hallways of pri-
vately-owned residential buildings. This installation would surely
constitute a permanent physical occupation, but a severe burden
on property rights it would not be. In fact, such a government ac-
tion could actually relieve landowners of the legal burden of in-
stalling smoke detectors at their own expense.
Beyond that, and more significantly, the permanent physical
occupation test was not established in order to save landowners
from burdens, unique or otherwise. The test actually has nothing
to do with the issue of harm to property rights. When it created
the test, the Loretto Court was concerned not with burdens on
property rights, but rather with the statute that was imposing the
complained-of harm. In Loretto, a local cable television provider,
acting under authority of a New York statute that provided, inter
alia, that a landlord may not "interfere with the installation of
cable television facilities upon his property or premises," 14' had
installed television transmission equipment on the plaintiffs
building. 42 The provider did not install much: it affixed some less-
than-one-half inch cable along the length of the affected building,
about eighteen inches above the roof top, two directional taps,
each about four inches cubed, one on the front and the other on
the rear of the roof, and two "large" silver boxes along the roof
139. The unique burden such occupations inevitably produce, in the Court's judg-
ment, is the elimination of landowners' rights to exclude non-owners from coming on
their land or from placing equipment on their land. Id. at 539. The Court character-
ized the right to exclude as "most fundamental." Id.
140. Of course, if a permanent physical occupation imposes no burden at all, it per
force cannot impose a "unique burden."
141. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423 (1982).
The statute was section 828 of the New York Executive Law. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 828
(McKinney Supp. 1982).
142. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
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cables. 143 Part of a cable "highway" in Manhattan, the equipment
was in place for two years before the plaintiff acquired property
rights to the affected building. 144 The equipment did not disturb
the daily use of the building.
On the question of whether this statute worked a taking, the
Court of Appeals for the State of New York had found in the nega-
tive, reasoning (correctly) that the statute served the legitimate
public purpose of promoting cable television and only inconse-
quentially burdened the property rights of the plaintiff.145 The Su-
preme Court reversed because the statute was deficient in its
design-so deficient, in fact, that all other takings considerations
fell to the wayside. The statutory deficiency was not in the pur-
pose of the enactment, which the Supreme Court agreed was legit-
imate, but was in the means by which the statute pursued its
end. 146 The means, obviously, was by permanent physical occupa-
tion by the cable company's transmission equipment of an albeit
tiny portion of the exterior of the plaintiff's building. Declaring
such intrusions to be "unusually serious," the Court stated that,
"[I] n such a case, 'the character of the government action' not only
is an important factor in resolving whether the action works as a
taking but also is determinative."147 "In short," the Court elabo-
rated, " when the 'character of the governmental action,' is a per-
manent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have
found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has
only minimal economic impact on the owner."148 Thus was the
143. Id. at 422.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 424. The statute required installations to be done so as to protect the
affected premises, assessed costs of installation upon the company, and allowed for
compensation for any damage that installation or removal of facilities might cause.
Id. One member of the Court of Appeals panel found the statute to work a taking, but
viewed the required compensation payment of one dollar to be just compensation. Id
at 425.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 426.
148. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (citation omitted). But see Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (in which the Court spoke of physical occupations of real
property in terms of harm to property rights, albeit without citing Loretto). In Kaiser,
the Supreme Court held that the Government's imposition of a navigational servi-
tude, which afforded rights to members of the public to gain access to a privately-built
pond, was a taking where the landowner had reasonably relied on Government con-
sent in connecting the pond to navigable water. Id. at 167, 180. The Court in that case
was concerned with the matter of harm to property rights. Accordingly, it held "the
right to exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
[Vol. 25
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statute found to work a taking even though the economic harm it
caused was valued at a single dollar. 149
The significant fact to take away from this is the last one-
Loretto declared a taking in circumstances where legislation inter-
fered, as a practical matter, not at all with the exercise of rights in
property. The problem was how the legislation operated, not the
harm it caused to the landowner. The Court was flatly uncon-
cerned with the issue of burden to property, unique or other-
wise.150 Thus, any fair reading of Lingle brings one to an
unavoidable conclusion: if the reasoning of Lingle dooms the sub-
stantially advances test, it must also doom the permanent physi-
cal occupation test. 151
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation." Id. at 179-80.
149. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
150. As a peripheral matter, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539, 546
(2005), made reference to two other previous Supreme Court decisions, Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994). Nollan and Dolan were takings cases dealing with impositions of unequal bur-
dens (as distinct from unique burdens) on rights in property. The two cases stood for
the principle that unequal burdens were anathema to the Takings Clause. As Dolan
put it: "[Olne of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 384 (citing Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
One would speculate that the reasoning in Lingle would result in overturning
Nollan and Dolan. But the Court decided rather than overturn these decisions it
would recast them. The Court declared these two cases have nothing to do with tak-
ings. Rather, stated the Lingle Court, the unequal burdens visited upon property
owners are illegitimate for an entirely different constitutional reason: they are uncon-
stitutional conditions. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
[The two cases] involve a special application of the 'doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions,' which provides that 'the government may not require a
person to give up a constitutional right to receive just compensation when
property is taken for a public use in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relation-
ship to the property.'
Id.
This new reading of Nollan and Dolan leaves the law in some disarray. As the
Court apparently views it, a "unique" burden (Loretto) is a taking per se but an "une-
qual" burden (Nollan and Dolan) can never be a taking at all.
151. Another Supreme Court decision made vulnerable in the wake of Lingle is
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). In Hodel, the Court held that the destruction of a
property owner's right to transfer property to devisees constituted a taking. Id. at
718. As in Loretto, however, the Hodel Court's concern was not with the harm caused
to property rights but with the statute causing the harm. The Court in Hodel found
the statute to be defective, indeed, "extraordinary." 481 U.S. at 716. The Court even
went so far as to speculate the statute may well have been constitutional but for its
defective statutory design. Id. On the other side of the argument, Hodel did mention
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But Lingle is even more significant because, in addition to
overturning Loretto, Lingle also effectively eviscerates the "char-
acter of the government action" factor of Penn Central. The char-
acter factor is on equal footing with the permanent physical
occupation test in that neither is concerned with the matter of
burden on property rights. Rather, both the factor and the test are
all about substantive due process.
As noted earlier, the Court in Lingle expressly declined to re-
ject Penn Central's character factor because of its alleged connec-
tion with the issue of harm to property. 152 Notable, however, was
the Court's decidedly less than forthright way of making its case
in this regard. When the Lingle Court asserted that all three of
the Penn Central factors, including the character factor, bore on
the issue of harm to property, it appended a telling qualifier. As
the Court put it, "the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part,
albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's eco-
nomic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate
property interests."153 The "albeit not exclusively" phrase was a
giveaway, a concession that to some extent the Penn Central fac-
tors relate to considerations other than harm to property. Having
acknowledged this prospect, the Court quickly dropped the matter
and shifted its attention to Agins.'54
But changing the topic did not dissipate the significance of
the qualifying phrase. There is only one plausible reason the
Court included the phrase "albeit not exclusively," and that is the
character factor. For this factor stands on different footing than
Penn Central's economic harm and IBE factors. The character fac-
tor relates to how the government proceeds, not to the burdens on
property rights its actions may produce. The character factor, in
other words, stands shoulder to shoulder with the permanent
physical occupation test and the Agins substantially advances
test. All three reside in the universe of substantive due process.
All three inquire of the behavior of government rather than of the
harm to property that behavior might produce. Given that identity
of purpose and effect, Lingle's condemnation of the Agins test per
force condemns the Penn Central character factor as well.' 55
that "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class of prop-
erty may be a taking." Id. at 717.
152. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Of course, these two tests are not entirely identical. The "substantially ad-
vances" test declared a statute to be infirm on efficiency grounds-the failure of a
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Significantly, the Supreme Court itself has conceded the point
by treating the character factor and the substantially advances
test as kindred spirits. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beck-
with,156 for example, the Court made the following statement:
"[Tihis Court has been permissive in upholding governmental ac-
tion that may deny the property owner of some beneficial use of
his property or that may restrict the owner's full exploitation of
the property, if such public action is justified as promoting the
general welfare." 57 The italicized phrase, obviously, is an alter-
nate phrasing of the substantially advances test of Agins. Yet, to
support its assertion, the Court did not cite Agins, which it had
handed down only six months before it decided Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies.158 Rather, the Court cited Penn Central as the appro-
priate legal support. 59 Thus did the Court effectively conjoin the
character factor and the substantially advances test.
In this same vein, consider the Court's decision in Andrus v.
Allard, decided only a year after Penn Central. 60 In Andrus, the
Court examined the Eagle Protection Act,' 6 ' and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act,' 62 federal statutes which effectively prohibited
commercial activity with respect to birds and bird parts.163 Rely-
statute to sufficiently promote the public interest can doom it. The character factor,
on the contrary, purports to group government actions into categories of relative vir-
tue. Some statutes are more worthy (and, accordingly, more likely to be declared valid
on review) and some are less worthy (and, therefore, less likely to be declared valid on
review). As Penn Central explained, "[A] 'taking may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical occupation by govern-
ment than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted). Why govern-
mental regulatory initiatives should enjoy a wider berth for takings purposes was
assumed, not explained.
156. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
157. Id. at 163 (emphasis added) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 at 125-129).
158. Agins was argued on April 15, 1980 and decided on June 10, 1980; Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies was argued on October 15, 1980 and decided on December 9,
1980. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 499 U.S. at 155, 163-164.
159. Id. at 163.
160. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1972).
162. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2004).
163. The text of the Eagle Protection Act provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, without being permitted to do so as hereinafter provided in this
subchapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the conse-
quences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell,
purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any
manner any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle, or any
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ing on Penn Central, the Court found no taking. Such a finding is
simply incoherent if, as the Court in Lingle maintained, all three
factors of Penn Central relate to the issue of harm to property.
Were that true, the Court in Andrus would have had no choice but
to find a taking, for the harm visited upon the plaintiff was virtu-
ally total.16 4 Concluding to the opposite, the Supreme Court in An-
drus revealed its view of Penn Central:
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, is our most
recent exposition on the Takings Clause. That exposition need
not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that government
regulation-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights for
the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential
for the use or economic exploitation of private property. 165
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental
power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of 'justice and fair-
ness.' 166 There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial inter-
vention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas
and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. 167 Resolu-
tion of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exer-
cise of judgment as for the application of logic. 168
Andrus, therefore, is a case where (a) no taking was found (b)
despite virtually total destruction of rights in property (c) based
golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the forego-
ing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant
to this Act, shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year or both:... Provided further, That nothing herein shall be
construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any bald eagle, alive
or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8,
1940, and that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or
transportation of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg
thereof, lawfully taken prior to the addition to this Act of the provisions
relating to preservation of the golden eagle.
16 U.S.C. § 668 (a) (2007).
164. The Court in Andrus did contend that some "property" in the items remained
after the regulation hit home, since plaintiffs could still possess, transfer, donate, and
devise the animal parts. Andrus, 444 U.S. 51, 66. Held the unanimous Court, this was
enough value to satisfy the Takings Clause, even though the only remaining present
value was the right to possess. Id. at 67-68. The Andrus opinion cited Pennsylvania
Coal for the proposition that government can infringe on rights in property in many
cases without paying compensation. Id. at 66.
165. Id. at 65 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 123-128 (1978)).
166. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
167. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-128.
168. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65. The decision in Andrus was authored by Justice
Brennan.
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on the reasoning of Penn Central. Either Andrus is an abject fail-
ure of judicial reasoning or it is proof the Penn Central factors are
not entirely about harm to property. The second of these alterna-
tives is the obvious option. The Court in Andrus understood Penn
Central for what it is; Lingle's contrary description of the charac-
ter factor distorts the factor's true meaning. It is unwarranted ju-
dicial revisionism.
Even more evidence may be found in the case of Concrete Pipe
& Products of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for Southern California.169 Concrete Pipe, a post-Penn Central
case, effectively dismissed economic harm as a relevant factor in
takings law. 170 The case dealt with liability of employers under
federal law to contribute to employee pension plans. 171 In Concrete
Pipe, the Court made the remarkable assertion that "mere dimi-
nution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to
demonstrate a taking."172
CONCLUSION
From the 1930s until the decision in Lingle, substantive due
process has played a substantial role with respect to the capacity
of rights in contract and property to deter the exercise of govern-
mental power. Lingle offers the first real hope to reduce that influ-
ence in the arena of takings law. If the logic of Lingle is given
expression in future decisions, the influence of substantive due
process theory in the law of takings should erode and, one would
hope, ultimately end. If read broadly, Lingle might serve as well to
call into question the similar infusion of substantive due process
theory into the law of the Contract Clause.
169. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
170. Id. at 645.
171. Id. at 605.
172. Id. at 645 (emphasis added). In its application of the Penn Central factors, the
Court concluded the character of the government action (there, termed the "nature" of
the government action) was unobjectionable, since it was merely a regulatory pro-
gram designed to adjust the benefits and burdens of economic life. Id. at 643.
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